When the theft is inevitable

The hack of Equifax data centre followed by the Yahoo’s revelation of the exposure of its 3bn user accounts (in contrast to 1bn reported before) once again drew attention to the question of exposure of our private and personal data retained by global information aggregators. Due to enormous amounts of information they hold about you, me, and millions of others, they are quite a catch for cyber criminals. As the number of attacks similar to the one that targeted Equifax and their sophistication level will undoubtedly be increasing in near future, so will the chance of your personal data ending up in the hands of criminals.

While there is little we can do about Equifax and their security competencies, we certainly can do a lot more about platforms and services within our control. I am not talking social networks here; surprisingly, the fact that we understand the risks they pose to our privacy helps us perform some form of self-moderation when sharing our private details through them.

Such institution as banks, insurance companies, online retailers, payment processors, and major cross-industry service providers like BT, NHS, or DVLA, especially those under the obligation of KYC or AML compliance, hold enormous amounts of information about their customers, often without them realising this. The scope and value of this information expands far beyond payment card details. A hacker who gains access to a customer database held by any of those companies would almost certainly obtain an unconditional capability to impersonate any customer at any security checkpoint that does not require their physical presence (such as a telephone banking facility or a login form on a web site). For example, they could order a new credit card for themselves through your online banking account, or buy goods on Amazon in your name – but you’ll never see any of them.

This means that we may soon face an even steeper rise in the numbers of identity thefts and related fraud offences, and the Equifax precedent shows that we should take reasonable steps to protect us from those despite all the security assurances given to us by the information custodians. While in most cases we can’t influence online aggregators as to what details to keep and what security methods to employ, we can choose to strengthen the security checkpoints instead, and do this by tightening identity checks, limiting levels of access they grant us, and monitoring them for any suspicious activity.

Employing two-factor authentication is one of the best approaches to tightening the identity checks. If an online service offers it, use it. Even if the attacker manages to use your stolen identity to change your password through the legitimate password recovery procedure, they will be unable to sign in without having access to your second factor.

Limiting access levels is primarily about setting up artificial limits on the actions that you – or the impostor – can conduct with your account. These include any maximum amounts of money that can be spent in one day or month, hours of the day during which the account may be accessed, permitted locations and so on. Many online services offer support for such limitations, and it’s wise to use them. This is mainly a corrective facility that would help minimise your losses should your account get hacked.

Monitoring is about setting up e-mail or text notifications that would inform you about any usual and unusual activity around your account. Having a notification system in place is often the fastest way to identify that your account was hacked. Checking consistency of your account data manually from time to time may help much too.

Finally, it is always a good idea to follow the principle of the least disclosure. If the service doesn’t ask you for some details, or allows you not to answer – don’t give the details away just because. It inevitably turns out that the less a service knows about you, the better it is for you. Again, if you are offered a choice between providing less safe and more safe details, choose wisely. For example, setting up a recurring payment to be collected by direct debit is safer than have it charged monthly to a credit card.

To summarise the above,

1. Most online services suck at security; expect your details to be stolen one day.

2. Minimise the impact of the prospective theft by securing your sign-ins, limiting legitimate access, and setting up access monitoring.

3. Don’t give your personal information away unless required/forced to do so.