Security ain’t simple, and it will never be

Every few months or so, we get a message from a customer that sounds like this:

I am looking to integrate JWT to my app. I found this tutorial and trying to follow it in my code. I am now trying to encrypt the signature with an RSA public key and decrypt it later with my private key to compare the hashes, but for some reasons my encryption results are always different.

If you don’t follow what’s happening, and I think most of my readers don’t, here’s what.

First, one guy publishes a tutorial that explains the townsfolk a general process of building a space rocket. Just take some titanium for the body, solder a guidance system (shouldn’t be that much harder than soldering that SatNav chip to your Arduino board), get some rocket fuel – just be careful, it is a bit super-deadly – and in a few months top you’ll be able to check for yourself whether the Great Wall can really be seen from space.

This makes Mick, an honest town lad, interested (he was a bit into rockets himself back in Y7), and he decides to launch a space travel business, using that tutorial as a guide for building his own space rocket. Mick decides to replace titanium with aluminum (as that is cheaper that way), but his aluminum doesn’t stay in shape as per the instructions because the feathering is too heavy for it. He feels frustrated and decides to get rid of some of the feathering.

Meanwhile, the town is getting interested in the project, and Mick’s bookings are growing steadily.

* * *

When my friend got her first car, her mum said to her: I’m super happy for you, darling. Could you please promise me that you will always bear in mind one important thing: it may not always look like that, but you are about to take care of a 3-tonne killing machine. Please be careful.

My friend recalls these words every time she turns the key.

We need to grow up. We need to understand that security is serious. We need to bear in mind that by integrating security into a product we are taking care, well, not of a killing machine, but of something of a very similar scale. Taking it lightly is extremely dangerous.

And I think Mick is as much of a victim here as his customers are. Tutorials like the one mentioned in the beginning of this post make complex things look simple. They make high-risk systems appear risk-free. They say, ah look at this funny thing here, it is called security and even you can do it. Go ahead!

I have actually been a Mick numerous times myself. I love doing things with my hands and consider myself a capable DIY’er – something of an orange or even green belt. And yet, dozens of times I have let YouTube DIY videos delude myself into thinking that a job is not as complex as I thought it was. Hey, just look how easy it was for that young couple to build a patio. Surely it can’t be that hard?

The outcome? I don’t want to talk about it.

And that’s why I stopped writing any manuals, guidance, todo’s, instructions, or whitepapers on security topics unless I am absolutely certain that the audience is capable of following them. Even when I do, I warn my readers that the job they are looking to embark on requires excellent technical competence, and I do so boldly and unambiguously. Security engineering is one of the largest surfaces for the dropped washers, and by directing irresponsibly you are playing your own part in creating the future chaos.

So, let’s re-iterate it for one last time:


WARNING:

Security is complex and can be dangerous if approached irresponsibly. Please, do not make it look simple.


Picture credit: FDA

The Dropped Washer Effect

One of these buildings can melt your car down. Can you identify the culprit?

Have you ever come across a situation where something, utterly negligible and minor, had become a cause for a major disruption or even an accident? Such as a small crack in an underground water pipe, dripping inconspicuously for a couple of years, and eventually causing a landslide after accumulating a critical mass of water? Or a seemingly common glass building capable of focusing the sunlight so that it melts the bodywork of cars parked nearby?

If so, chances are high that you observed an example of the Dropped Washer effect. Named after a Boeing 737 accident in Okinawa, Japan, the dropped washer effect describes large-scale adverse events that happened because of the cause of an incomparably lower significance. The unfortunate Boeing ended up burning out completely because of a missing slat mechanism washer, 0.625 inches wide, that the engineering crew forgot to replace after the aircraft’s last service.

One characteristic of the potential dropped-washer features that makes them particularly naughty is their zero perceived value for the business. Offering no added opportunities and presenting no apparent risks for the product, they often do not even exist in the minds of the product stakeholders. This important peculiarity makes it all too easy for them to slip every safety measure employed in modern production flows – from risk assessment to quality control.

Happily, in many cases there are techniques that can help increase our chances of spotting and eliminating the dropped washers from our projects.

Check out my new paper here.

Picture credit: Reuters

Check Your Backups, Now

Last week, a number of services hosted in Google Cloud suffered a dramatic outage. Following a maintenance glitch, services like YouTube, Shopify, Snapchat, and thousands of others became unavailable or very slow to respond. Overall, the services were down for more than four hours, before the availability of the platform was finally restored.

The curious thing about this incident was not the outage itself (sweet happens), but the circumstances behind it that made it last that long. Cloud service providers, as a rule, aim for the highest levels of availability, which are carved in their SLAs. So how could it happen that one of the leading global computing platforms was taken down for more than four hours? Happily, Google is very good in debriefing its failures, so we can have a sneak peek at what have actually happened behind the scenes.

It all started with a few computing nodes which needed to undergo routine maintenance and thus had to be temporarily removed from the cloud – a common day-to-day activity. And then something went wrong. Due to a glitch in the internal task scheduler, many more other, worker nodes had been mistakenly dismissed – drastically reducing the total throughput of the platform, and causing a Chertsey-style gridlock.

Ironically, Google did everything right, exceptionally right. They considered that risk on the design stage. They had a smart recovery mechanism in place that should have kicked in to recover from the glitch and provide the necessary continuity. The problem was that the recovery mechanism itself was supposed to be run by the faulty scheduler. Yet, being a system management task with a lower priority than the affected production services, it was pushed far back in the execution queue. And since the queue was miles long by that time, the recovery service in the choking cloud has never made its way to its time slice.

Any lessons we can learn from this incident? There are myriads; the deeper your knowledge about cloud infrastructures is, the more conclusions you can draw from it. A security architect can draw at least the following two:

1. Backing up systems is a process, not a one-off task. Your backup routine might have worked at the time you set it up, but things break, media dies, and passwords change.  Don’t risk, go and test your backups now – emulate a disaster, pull that cord, and see if your arrangements are capable of providing continuity. Don’t be tempted just to check the scripts – try the actual process in the field. Put this check on your schedule and make it a routine.

2. When designing a backup or recovery system, take extra care to minimize its dependencies on the system being recovered. It is worth remembering that modern digital environments are very complex, and you might need to be quite imaginative to recognise all possible interdependencies. The recovery system should live in its own world, with its own operating environment, connectivity, and power supply.

It is very easy to get caught in this trap, as it gives us the imaginary peace of mind we’re craving for. We know that the system is there for us, and we sleep well at night. We know that should a bad thing happen, it will give us its shoulder. We only realise it is not going to when it’s too late to do anything to make it right.

Just as I was writing this, my friend called me with a story. She went on an overseas trip, and, while being there, wanted to Skype home. Skype, however, having realised her IP was unusual, applied extra security and sent her a verification e-mail. It all would have ended there, if only her Skype account wasn’t bound to a very old e-mail account at an ISP that was blocked in the country for political reasons – so she couldn’t get to her inbox to confirm her identity. Luckily it was just Skype and luckily she knew about VPN – but the things might have become way more complex with a different, life-critical service.

So, really, you will never know how a cow catches a hare. There are way too many factors that may kick in unexpectedly, and, worst of all, unknown unknowns are among them. Still, by using the above two approaches wisely and persistently, you may reduce the risks to the negligible level, which is well worth the effort.

Picture credit: danielcheong1974

A Bag of Contention

A lot has been said about passengers stopping to collect their cabin bags while escaping the blazing Aeroflot aircraft in Moscow last week. Some media went as far as blaming them for excessive deaths of those trapped behind them, with certain Russian politicians even urging to initiate criminal proceedings against those who stopped to pick their bags up (yes, in Russia, party still goes to you © Yakov Smirnoff).

The moral perspective of this complicated matter is unlikely to ever have any kind of satisfactory resolution. It goes deep into the pre-social parts of our brain, mostly cared for by instincts, reflexes, and fight-or-flight responses – and nature is extremely difficult to judge. In the moments of extreme stress and imminent risk of death, few people would think of anything other than their own salvation. The extent of that few depends on many factors, with different social groups balancing fight, flight, and collaborate differently, but it is crystal clear that we can’t blame people for acting selfishly when their lives are in danger.

That being said, there is no doubt that the problem must be dealt with, for the sake of our own future, first of all. Obviously, the collection of cabin bags did delay the evacuation (though the extent of its contribution is yet to be assessed – and I hope it will be assessed). Yet, what’s more important, is that should a similar accident happen again, in whatever town or country it might take place, the behaviour patterns of the escaping passengers are very likely to be highly similar to what we’ve observed in Sheremetyevo.

The fact is, the safety rules around hand luggage, both written and unwritten, are quite relaxed. Effectively, you can do whatever you like with your bags while on board as long as they fit into the airline’s allowance and don’t contain prohibited items. While pre-flight safety briefings advise you against taking your cabin bags with you during evacuation, this is hardly being enforced. It might be hard to resist the temptation to grab the bag that contains valuables such as your passport, phone, or laptop.

One of the reasons for that is that over the last few decades the role and concept of cabin luggage significantly changed – while the rules governing it remained largely the same. For the vast share of today’s passengers, their cabin bags are their primary and only luggage, especially on short-haul flights. It differs drastically from what it used to be twenty years ago, when most of carry-on items were jackets, overcoats, clutches, and an odd duty free bag, with the principal luggage checked into the aircraft hold. The hold itself acted as a physical security control: in case of an emergency, there was no way for the passengers to retrieve their bags. The small or useless carry-on items didn’t pose any risk of a slowdown during the evacuation. Conversely, most of hand luggage items today are stuffed-to-capacity purpose-made ‘cabin bags’, designed and manufactured specifically to ‘just fit’ into the measuring cages. This makes a huge difference, and this is the problem that must be addressed in the safety rules.

The abundance of bulky personal items on board the aircraft is even more complicated by the fact that with many airlines you can’t bring two cabin bags on board, however small the second one is. This forces you to fit everything you need to take with you into that single piece, mixing items of low and high value in one huge cabin suitcase. Should you need to evacuate, even if you would only intend to grab the high-value items, you would have no other option but to take the bulky low-value ones with you too.

So we need to find a convenient way to address those matters. We can’t make people not care about what they value (e.g. their passport) – but we can totally help them with leaving whatever they value less behind. For example, we could give the cabin crew the powers to lock the overhead cabin bag compartments for the whole duration of the flight, and at the same time extend the hand luggage policy to include a [much] smaller second bag. This second bag could be as small as a clutch, a belt bag, or a neck pouch – just enough to accommodate your passport, phone, and wallet.

Such approach would let passengers separate their items of importance (which in most cases are quite compact in size) from the less significant ones. It would introduce a security control in the form of a lockable overhead compartment, yet give passengers peace of mind that the items they value won’t be lost or destroyed should they need to evacuate.

One way or another, one thing that can be said for sure is that the question of aircraft evacuation and the role of hand luggage in it should not be shelved. The lessons of the Aeroflot crash should be learned, in particular in respect of hand luggage policies and procedures. We would be complete fools if we fail to admit the obvious and simply transfer the blame onto the survivors – since this would mean transferring the punishment onto our future selves.

Moby-Dick; or, the Threat

Norwegian fishermen caught a white beluga whale carrying a harness with surveillance equipment attached to it. Marine experts believe that the whale had been trained by Russian navy, before escaping from its base in Murmansk and heading west through the waters of the Arctic ocean.

I doubt the whale had anything to do with Russian navy for a number of reasons (and it’s not for the ‘St Petersburg’ label on its harness, which, despite its absurdity, counts towards the opposite), but, really, there is nothing that would have prevented the navy from being the actual origin of the animal. For many years Russian military have been experimenting with training underwater mammals to guard their military bases in the Arctic, not to mention that one of their first initiatives in Ukrainian Crimea after temporarily anschluß’ing the peninsula in 2014 was restoring a long-dismissed Soviet dolphin training facility in Sevastopol.

What’s worth noting about this curious occasion is that we got used to believing that attacks, intrusions, and security compromises that originate from man-made sources normally rely on the man-made technologies. The Norwegian story illustrates that it is a mistake to underestimate the risks posed by nature’s own creations, in particular due to their natural ability to disguise, and our own, very human, propensity to think of ourselves as being above the nature, and, conversely, of the nature being well below us.

Trained animals, while probably being one of the most significant, is not the only man-aided source of security threats having their origins in the natural environment. There are certain geological threats: man-provoked floods, rainfalls, earthquakes, and tsunamis. There are biological threats: inflicted invasions of vermin, planted insect-spread diseases, and distribution of weed species capable of taking over large areas of land. Those threats are very hard to recognise, very hard to investigate, and very hard to mitigate.

Apart from direct risks of proactive exploitation of geological and biological opportunities, nature opens up a huge number of covert channels which can be used to spy on opponent’s activities. One example is that excessive waste from a highly concealed military base can lead to increase in population of foxes and other scavengers in surrounding areas. However small those deviations could be, modern monitoring and data mining facilities are likely to be capable in detecting them. Modern AI (let’s just call it that way) is exceptional in detecting and matching patterns, and nature provides countless possibilities for it to learn what the right way of things should look like – and what it should not.

Undoubtedly, crafting attacks involving nature is quite demanding, and brain- and labour-intensive. Setting them up requires a lot of investment and effort, which are only affordable for the richest of this world. Still, it’s all about ‘Il fine giustifica i mezzi’, in the end, isn’t it?

Picture credit: Guardian

7 Security Mistakes Boeing Made

The story of the two recent Boeing 737 MAX crashes is packed with questions we are yet to find answers to, yet it is already clear that the distinctive feature of the double tragedy is overwhelming number of gross blunders – a lot more than you would expect in a field so extremely attentive to security and safety as commercial aviation.

While we don’t know all the details of the crashes so far, what we do know points out a number of grievous security flaws:

  • security feature as a paid option, not by default: Boeing charged airlines extra for sensor discrepancy detectors; neither LionAir nor Ethiopian aircraft had them installed;
  • hiding information: Boeing hid from 737 pilots that their new aircraft featured a new MCAS system, which could quietly intervene and override the pilots’ control of the aircraft;
  • ignoring feedback: MAX pilots complained to FAA about issues with the aircraft’s in-flight performance, but those were largely silenced/ignored;
  • no safeguards for MCAS failure: this has not been officially confirmed, but it looks like pilots wouldn’t be able to switch off MCAS if they needed to, effectively being unable to fly the aircraft fully manually to recover from MCAS or sensor failure;
  • creating workarounds rather than fixing bugs: the MCAS system was introduced to balance the MAX’s tendency to raise its nose up due to changes in the aircraft’s aerodynamics as a result of its bigger engines. In other words, the essence of MCAS is effectively adding a ton of BBQ sauce on to your overpeppered steak, rather than cooking a well-peppered steak from the very start.
  • conflict of interest: it appears that a great deal of safety tests of the new aircraft were performed by its very creators;
  • trust compromise: this is by far the grossest mistake made by Boeing and FAA; something that might well affect the success of the whole MAX family and of its freshest 777X machine, which was quietly (guess why) introduced two days ago. Whereas the whole world had been grounding their MAX fleets, Boeing chose the tactics of silencing the matter, denying any allegations, and refusing to admit similarities between LionAir and Ethiopian crashes. The only statement that made sense from them was about introducing a vague ‘software update.’ A matter of uttermost importance is that, as per Boeing’s own words, the prospective change was in the works well before the second crash.

I feel incredibly sorry for those who lost their friends and relatives in the crashes, and I feel sorry for the designers of the MAX, which is without doubt a great aircraft. I only hope that the investigation goes smoothly (with Boeing bosses apparently being quite reluctant for it to), and discovers the full truth about the crashes. Being sensible humans, the best we can do for those who gave up their lives to the tragedy, is to learn our lessons and write down all the mistakes we made, and then do everything in our power to prevent anything similar from happening in future.

Picture credit: Boeing

The Greatest Backdoor

The greatest backdoor of all times might be running right before your eyes.

Earlier today we were quite surprised to discover that our Windows build server rebooted after installing another set of automatic updates. This looked weird, as automated reboots without an administrator’s approval have never been on our security policy. Still, given that we have just upgraded our Windows Server from 2012 to 2016, we believed it to be a misconfiguration issue and embarked on correcting it.

Surprisingly, disabling automated restarts in Windows Server 2016 appeared to be not an easy task. Believe it or not, but unlike it used to be in Server 2012, there is no direct setting in Server 2016 to disable the reboots. You have to employ awkward workarounds, like always having someone logged in, to stop your server from rebooting. Otherwise, it will always reboot automatically, every time a yet another bunch of updates are downloaded and installed.

This looks very worrying. Many server administrators quite reasonably prefer to be in control of reboots of their servers to harmonise them with their working hours, system load, backup and maintenance schedules, and myriad other factors. A mission-critical server that reboots out of the blue in the middle of the night may (and will) lead to all sorts of problems – from a local DoS after failing to complete the restart, to a gaping hole in the company’s network if a third-party IPS fails to co-operate with the updated version of some Windows component.

From a more distant perspective, by removing the possibility to disable automated reboots, Microsoft has acquired a gigantic ‘power switch’, which it can use to force thousands of servers across the world into rebooting by simply sending them a specific ‘update’ package. This puts the owners of those servers into an uncomfortable position of hostages. Even if we do believe in good intentions of the Seattle company, how can we be sure that someone won’t break into their update delivery environment one day, and use the legitimate update procedure to send to all the Windows servers out there a deadly restart command?

Image credit: pngtree.com

Skill vs Technology: a zero-sum game?

Last week I came across two peculiar stories dedicated to the role played by technology in the evolution of the civil aviation industry. While the stories were barely related to each other at first glance – and had I come across them at different points in time I probably would have never spot that huge connection between them – but luckily I was still thinking about the first story when I bumped into the second one, and immediate realisation of the scale of the apparent trend made quite an impression on me.

That first story was about the role of technology in the crash of Air France transatlantic flight 447 back in 2009. The primary conclusion from the investigation that the article elaborates on is that the pilots were so got used to flying with assistance of the autopilot that they became completely lost when they faced the need to fly the aircraft manually. They’ve just got no understanding of the situation whatsoever, as they’ve lacked the hands-on feel for flying the aircraft at cruise altitudes – something normally handled by the autopilot. In addition to that, the autopilot, designed with intelligence and pilot-friendliness in mind, didn’t warn the pilots that the aircraft was approaching a complete stall, after interpreting the way-too-sharply plummeting speed as an indicator of a probable false alarm.

Confused and lost, the pilots applied several corrective actions to get the aircraft back on its course. Unfortunately, due to the pilots’ lack of situational awareness, those actions had become fatal. The A330 lost its airspeed and crashed into the ocean, killing all 228 people on board. Ironically, the investigation had shown that should the pilots not intervene in the situation, AF447 would have continued at its cruise altitude as it should even with its autopilot switched off.

The second story I read was on a far more positive side, depicting prospective transition of the London City airport air traffic control tower from the airfield itself to a small place called Swanwick, Hampshire, some 80 miles away. Specifically, twelve HD screens and a thick communication channel are going to be used to replace the existing watch tower, and are claimed to provide far better insight into aircraft landings and take-offs performed at the airport, as well as a number of augmented reality perks. The experience of LCY is then expected to be picked up by other airports around the country, effectively making air traffic control tower operations an outsourced business.

The fact that impressed me the most about these two articles was that they both, despite being barely related per se, are essentially telling us the same story, the story of skills typically attributed to humans being taken over by technology. It’s just that the first article tells us about the end of the story, while the second one is rather at the very beginning of it.

Just like such advances in technology as the glass cockpit and way-too-smart autopilots led to pilots losing their grip in manual flying, switching to augmented HD view of the runway will inevitably lead to air traffic control operators losing their basic skills, like tuning binoculars or assessing meteorological conditions by a dozen of nearly subconscious cues. The trained sharpness of their eyes, now supported by HD zoom, will most certainly diminish. Sooner or later, the operators will be unable to manage the runway efficiently without being assisted by the technology.

And this is the challenge we are going to face in the near future. The more human activities typically referred to as ‘acquired skills’ are going to be taken over by technology and automation, the less able we are going to be about those skills ourselves. If a muscle isn’t constantly trained, it wears off. If a musician stops playing regularly, she eventually loses her skill to improvise. If a cook doesn’t dedicate as much time to cooking, his food loses its character, despite cooked from the same quality ingredients and using the same proportions.

And that’s not necessarily bad. As the technology is inevitably making its way to our lives, taking over those of our skills which it can perform better than we do, there is no reason not to embrace it – but embrace thoughtfully, realising the consequences of us losing grip on them. Remember that we had lost a big deal of our skills to the past already. Your great-grandfather is very likely to had been particularly good in fox hunting, your grandad probably performed much better than you in fly fishing, and certainly a much wider proportion of population were capable in horse riding two centuries ago than it is today. Those skills had been taken away from us by technology and general obsolescence, but do we really need them today?

What we need though is to have a clear understanding of the consequences of sharing activities we got used to do with technology, and be prepared to observe a steep decline in the quality of our own respective hand skills as technology gradually takes them over. Understanding that problem alone and taking our imperfect human nature as it is will most certainly help us manage the risks around technological advances more efficiently.

(pictured: a prototype of the digital control room at NATS in Swanwick, credit: NATS)

Detective story. Almost a classic.

When we are away, our house is looked after by security cameras. Whenever a camera detects motion in its view, it captures a set of photos and sends them to a dedicated mailbox. This setup adds to the peace of mind about the safety of our house while we are away, and comes with a nice bonus of observing random shots of the cat wandering around the house.

Our last trip added a piece of an action to the scheme. On the second day’s morning I woke up only to find ~200 camera e-mails in my inbox (the cat’s portraits typically account for 5-8). “Gotcha!”, I rubbed my hands. But I was too quick. All the 200+ photos, apart from 2-3 that actually captured the cat, were quite boring and very similar to each other: an empty room and some blurred spots in the centre. And no sign of burglars.


And that was only a beginning. Hour after hour, camera e-mails continued to come in, one in a minute. Finally, I gave up and returned to doing my business as usual. This decision proved to be tactically correct, as every morning since I woke up to find yet another 200-300 new camera e-mails in my inbox. Every morning I opened 2-3 emails randomly, observed the empty room and the spots, and proceeded to my business. At the time, I didn’t pay attention to the fact that all those messages were only coming in when it was night time at the camera time zone, and this fact was of big significance.

I managed to get back to this avalanche of alerts well after I returned back home. My findings appeared to be quite amusing.

In one of the rooms monitored by a camera a flying insect had found itself a shelter. When the lights went low in the evening, the camera switched from daytime to infrared mode, which resulted in a dim reddish backlight being turned on. Apparently, the bug was attracted to this backlight, and began to flutter around the camera. The camera detected the bug’s motion, and in full accordance with its setup activated the shutter and dispatched the pictures where instructed. During the daylight the camera was turning to a simple piece of furniture, the insect was losing its interest in it, and the flow of e-mails was stopping for a while – to start the cycle over in the dusk.

But that’s not the end of the story. To send out the photos, the cameras use a dedicated e-mail address at my hosting account. To prevent this e-mail account from being used by spammers, the number of messages that can be sent through is capped with 300 per day. The bug was apparently in a darn good shape, as it was managing to consume the whole message allowance way before noon – after which the mail server stopped accepting further messages from the cameras until the start of the next day. This meant that should the hypothetical burglars have planned their dark affairs for the afternoon, they could have avoided the scrutiny of the cameras, and make it off without being noticed – and all due to some tiny bug in the system (*).

The moral of this fable is,

(1) no matter how good at risk assessment you are, there always will be an unaccounted bug whose fluttering will turn all your mitigations down to a joke;

(2) sometimes the measures you expect to protect you (I’m speaking about my outgoing e-mail limits) may turn against you;

(3) (the most important of all!) leave much less food for your cats than you normally do when you go away, so they have an incentive to hunt for any nonsense fluttering around your cameras!

(*) They actually couldn’t – you don’t think that some levitating invertebrate would just knock my whole security system down, do you?

Queen Elizabeth running Windows XP: how big is the issue?

Britain’s Largest Warship Uses Windows XP And It’s Totally Fine, says Michael Fallon, UK Defence Secretary. So is it really – is it OK to run a nearly-twenty-year-old operating system on a strategic battleship?

Unfortunately, what we know so far is way too little to come up with any justified answers. The statement as it is being put on the media (‘the ship runs on Windows XP‘) is utterly vague, unprofessional, and misleading. A warship like Queen Elizabeth has hundreds of different subsystems responsible for tasks of greater or lesser importance. Therefore the first thing that should be identified is the level of involvement of Windows XP in the general routine of operating the warship.

In other words, are those XP machines responsible for crew entertainment? Storing/accessing the logbook? Managing aircraft flight schedules? Tuning up engines? Transmitting cryptograms to the on-shore facilities?

Are they connected to the local warship’s network? To the Internet? If they are, do they have the latest IPS software installed? Any firewalls? Any certified firewalls?

What kind of software is run on those machines? Who can access them? What tasks are they able to perform?

Only after answering the above and other similar questions it would be possible to establish whether those XP machines present any risk to the operation of the warship and the extent of that risk. Otherwise it would be no different to speculating about your neighbour being an extremist just because you once saw them with a big slaughter knife through their kitchen window.

And, by the way, it’s not only about Windows XP’s vulnerability to WannaCry or any other form of malware. Apart from that, a lot of genuine security technologies used in Windows XP are quite outdated. An eloquent example here is that the most recent version of the main communication security protocol, TLS, supported natively by Windows XP (1.0), had been officially retired a year ago. This means that any protected communications that the warship transmits from its XP machines would actually be not protected, and could be easily eavesdropped by third parties.

And yet, all of that wouldn’t make any sense if those Windows XP machines are only used by the crew to kick ass in Call of Duty in their free time, of course.